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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
Seven former clerks, who worked in a state judicial 
district in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania (the "Clerks"), 
brought a sex discrimination suit pursuant to Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq., in 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which named Dauphin 
County, among others, as a defendant. The district court 
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dismissed the Clerks' complaint against Dauphin County 
pursuant to Rule 12b(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure on the ground that as a matter of law, Dauphin 
County could not be considered either the Clerks' 
"employer" or "co-employer." Graves v. Lowery, No. CV-95- 
1624 (M.D. Pa. April 8, 1996). The Clerks appeal from the 
district court's order dismissing their complaint. 
 
On appeal, we are asked to address a narrow and unique 
question of employer liability under Title VII: whether the 
Clerks, who are formally considered employees of the 
judicial branch of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, are 
precluded, as a matter of Pennsylvania law, from pursuing 
a federal employment discrimination claim against Dauphin 
County, Pennsylvania. For the reasons stated below, we 
conclude that they are not so precluded. Accordingly, we 
will reverse the district court's order. 
 
I. 
 
The issue for resolution here arises from the continued 
uncertainty surrounding the structure of Pennsylvania's 
judicial system. In 1968, the Pennsylvania Constitution was 
amended to create a "Unified Judicial System." Pa. Const. 
art. V, § I; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 301 (West 1981) 
(corresponding statutory provision). That system, however, 
has yet to be fully implemented. Most significantly, for 
example, county courts continue to be funded by the 
individual counties in which those courts sit.1 Thus, the 
salaries of court employees are paid by county governments 
rather than the state. 
 
Because this system of funding is contrary to the idea of 
a "Unified Judicial System," the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court struck down the system as unconstitutional. See 
County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 534 A.2d 760 (Pa. 
1987).2 The court then stayed its order, directing the state 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Pennsylvania's unified court system consists of "the Supreme Court, 
the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court, courts of common pleas, 
community courts, municipal and traffic courts in the City of 
Philadelphia, such other courts as may be provided by law and justices 
of the peace." Pa. Const. art. V, § 1. 
 
2. In particular, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that county 
funding of county courts was an impediment to judicial unification 
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legislature to enact a new funding system that would truly 
"unify" the Pennsylvania judiciary. Id. at 765. To date, the 
state legislature has failed to enact a constitutional funding 
scheme. See Jim Strader, Counties Want State to Fund 
Courts; Supreme Court Will Try Again to Persuade 
Legislature to Pay for Running County Courts, Pitt. Post 
Gazette, Jan. 5, 1997, at B5; Phyllis W. Beck, Foreword: A 
Blueprint for Judicial Reform in Pennsylvania, 62 Temp. L. 
Rev. 693, 697 (1988) (describing unification of the judicial 
system as still "at the drawing board stage"). As a 
consequence, the uncertain status of the Unified Judicial 
System continues to cause a myriad of funding-related 
problems. See, e.g., Jiuliante v. County of Erie, 657 A.2d 
1245 (Pa. 1995) (court of common pleas sought to recoup 
from county attorney's fees incurred by court in defending 
itself against application of county's antinepotism policy to 
court employees); Snyder v. Snyder, 620 A.2d 1133 (Pa. 
1993) (dispute between court of common pleas and county 
over raise for court employees). 
 
The Clerks -- Marca M. Graves, Antoinette R. Trueitt, 
Laura Segarra, Debra C. Napper, Marshell L. Napper, 
Sherry L. Reiff, and Dorothy R. Clemons -- worked in 
Magisterial District 12-1-04, which is situated in and 
funded by Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.3  The Clerks 
worked under District Justice Horace A. Lowery, who was 
appointed in August of 1992 to fulfill the remaining term of 
a previous district justice.4 Approximately twenty-five clerks 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
because the potential infiltration of county politics would erode the 
integrity and impartiality of the judicial system. See County of Allegheny, 
534 A.2d at 765 ("[I]f court funding is permitted to continue in the hands 
of local political authorities it is likely to produce nothing but suspicion 
or perception of bias and favoritism."). 
 
3. Pennsylvania is divided into 60 judicial districts. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 901 (West 1996). Dauphin County is judicial district #12. Id. 
Magisterial districts are drawn within a given judicial district according 
to current population densities. Id. § 1502 (West 1981). 
 
4. There is one district justice in each magisterial district. See 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1511 (West 1981). District Justices have jurisdiction 
over such matters as landlord-tenant disputes, misdemeanor criminal 
offenses and civil claims for less than $8,000.00. See id. § 1515 (West 
1996). 
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worked in Magisterial District 12-1-04 when District Justice 
Lowery came into office. Not one of the seven clerks who 
are parties to this appeal was hired by Lowery. 
 
Within a short time after Lowery's arrival, the Clerks 
notified the office manager, Noime LeGrand, that Lowery 
had been sexually harassing them. The Clerks notified 
LeGrand pursuant to procedures set out in the sexual 
harassment policy contained in the Dauphin County 
Personnel Manual. After an investigation, LeGrand 
concluded that the Clerks' claims had merit and that 
Lowery's harassing conduct was pervasive. 
 
On January 20, 1993, LeGrand, along with nine co- 
workers, including the Clerks, submitted a formal 
complaint to the Dauphin County Court Administrator 
alleging various incidents of sexual harassment by Lowery. 
In response, Dauphin County convened an investigative 
panel, which was chaired by the County's Chief Clerk. The 
County also made counseling services available to the 
Clerks. 
 
Soon after the investigative panel was convened, Lowery 
fired LeGrand and an assistant bookkeeper, Elista Vennie. 
Lowery notified the Dauphin County Commissioners of his 
decision to terminate the two employees. Dauphin County, 
however, refused to effectuate the terminations and, 
instead, assigned the two employees to other magisterial 
districts within the County. The County continued to draw 
the salaries of LeGrand and Vennie from Lowery's budget. 
According to the County, it refused to effectuate Lowery's 
termination of the employees because it was concerned 
about its own potential liability if the employees later 
proved that Lowery's termination of the employees 
amounted to retaliatory discharge. 
 
Lowery then took a number of other retaliatory actions, 
including firing two of the Clerks -- Marca Graves and 
Sherry Reiff. He also refused to approve vacation time and 
other requests for some of the other clerks. 
 
Later, Lowery sought to fill the two positions vacated by 
LeGrand and Vennie. The County, however, refused to 
approve funding for the positions, maintaining that because 
LeGrand and Vennie -- the "terminated" employees -- were 
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still on the payroll and because their paychecks were 
coming out of Lowery's budget, he was, in effect, asking for 
funding for two additional positions. 
 
In an effort to compel the County to terminate LeGrand 
and Vennie and provide the funding necessary to hire two 
new employees, Lowery filed suit against the County in the 
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth 
Court held that "Lowery has the authority to discharge his 
employees without approval from the county 
commissioners, and the right to refill the positions thus 
vacated in his office." Lowery v. Sheaffer, No. 62 M.D. 
1993, slip op. at 4 (Pa. Commw. May 13, 1993). In addition, 
the court found that the County was required by state law 
to provide the court with adequate funding to maintain its 
operation. Id. The County then removed LeGrand and 
Vennie from the payroll. 
 
LeGrand and Vennie filed suit in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
Lowery and Dauphin County.5 LeGrand and Vennie alleged 
that the County's funding of their positions was sufficient 
to impose employer status on the County. Thus, according 
to LeGrand and Vennie, the County could be held liable 
under both Title VII and § 1983 theories. LeGrand v. 
Lowery, No. CV-93-1980, slip op. at 4 (M.D. Pa. May 3, 
1994). The district court dismissed the complaint against 
Dauphin County pursuant to Rule 12b(6), holding that 
because the judiciary was defined by state law as the 
employer of judicial personnel, Dauphin County could not 
be considered the employer of LeGrand and Vennie. Id. at 
8. We affirmed that decision by judgment order. LeGrand v. 
Lowery, 65 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 1995) (unpublished table 
decision). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Clerks and Dauphin County assert that the lawsuit filed by 
LeGrand and Vennie was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only. The 
district court, however, stated that the suit was brought under § 1983 
and Title VII. See LeGrand v. Lowery, No. CV-93-1980, slip op. at 2 
(M.D. Pa. May 3, 1994). Because the district court's analysis in LeGrand 
clearly discussed Dauphin County's potential liability in Title VII terms, 
see id. at 3-9, we will assume that LeGrand and Vennie did assert a Title 
VII claim. 
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LeGrand's claim proceeded against Lowery and, at a 
subsequent jury trial, Lowery was found individually liable 
to LeGrand under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.6  Immediately 
thereafter, Lowery filed for personal bankruptcy protection. 
 
The Clerks filed this Title VII action in the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania on September 26, 1995, against Lowery, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Dauphin County. The 
Clerks premised Title VII liability against the defendants on 
the following theory: that District Justice Lowery engaged in 
a pattern of quid pro quo sexual harassment, created a 
hostile working environment and retaliated against the 
Clerks for reporting his conduct; that Lowery was the 
supervisor of the Clerks; that Dauphin County was the co- 
employer of the Clerks; and that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court was the co-employer of the Clerks. The Clerks also 
alleged that, through custom, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court had delegated its statutorily granted governing 
authority over court employees to Dauphin County. In sum, 
the Clerks claimed that all three defendants exercised some 
employer-type authority over them and, accordingly, all 
three defendants could be held liable for Lowery's harassing 
conduct under Title VII. 
 
Dauphin County filed a motion to dismiss on the ground 
that under the Unified Judicial System, District Justice 
Lowery had the sole power to hire, fire and supervise his 
employees. The district court agreed and dismissed the 
complaint against Dauphin County, finding the case 
indistinguishable from LeGrand, which had previously 
determined that the County could not be considered an 
employer of county court employees. See Graves v. Lowery, 
No. CV-95-1624, slip op. at 2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 1996) (citing 
LeGrand v. Lowery, No. CV-93-1980, slip op. at 8 (M.D. Pa. 
May 3, 1994)). The Clerks appeal from the district court's 
dismissal of their complaint against Dauphin County.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. LeGrand was awarded $30,000 in damages. Vennie apparently 
dropped out of the case prior to the judgment. 
 
7. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court settled with the Clerks prior to the 
entry of the district court's order dismissing the Clerks' complaint 
against Dauphin County. Dauphin County implies that, by settling, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has accepted responsibility as the employer 
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The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
 
II. 
 
Our review of a district court's decision to dismiss a 
complaint for failure to state a claim is plenary. Nami v. 
Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). We must accept as 
true "the factual allegations in a complaint and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom." Holder 
v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(quoting Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 
103 (3d Cir. 1990)). Thus, a court should not grant a 
motion to dismiss "unless it appears beyond a doubt that 
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 
 
Dauphin County contends that the Clerks can assert no 
set of facts that would create an employer-employee 
relationship between the Clerks and Dauphin County. In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of the Clerks. As the Clerks note, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court did not concede its employer status. The Clerks state that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court asserted the following in support of its 
motion to dismiss: 
 
"[T]he general authority of the Supreme Court over courts of 
common pleas, let alone an individual magisterial district, is rarely 
if ever used, and the Unified Judicial System is not yet a reality. In 
light of [the] stay of the Allegheny County decision, the current 
system remains in place, and the Supreme Court exercises its 
supervisory powers only to do that which is reasonably necessary to 
insure the integrity of the system and the efficient administration of 
justice." 
 
Appellants' Reply Brief at 2 (quoting Memorandum of the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania in Support of Motion to Dismiss). 
 
For purposes of this appeal, we will assume that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has not accepted responsibility as the employer or co- 
employer of the Clerks. We note, however, that under the Clerks' theory 
of liability, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's status as their employer 
would not preclude the co-employer liability of the County. 
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Dauphin County's view, because the Clerks served at the 
discretion of District Justice Lowery, only he can properly 
be considered their employer. This employment 
relationship, the County claims, is defined by the 
Pennsylvania Constitution's requirement of a Unified 
Judicial System. See Pa. Const. Art. V, § 1. 
 
The statutes which implement the Pennsylvania 
Constitution's requirement of a unified system define the 
personal staff of judicial officers as "[p]rivate secretaries, 
law clerks and such other personnel as an individual may 
be authorized by law to select and remove . . . ." 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 102 (West 1981). Individual counties are 
required to maintain a judicial account from which they 
must pay the salaries, fees and expenses of the court 
systems within that county. See id. § 3541; Allegheny 
County v. Commonwealth, 534 A.2d 760 (Pa. 1987). 
 
Dauphin County maintains that even though counties 
across Pennsylvania are required to pay the salaries of 
court personnel, the personnel are "employed" by the 
courts. To support this contention, the County relies on a 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, which held: 
 
Since the court has the inherent right to hire, 
discharge and supervise, an employer-employee 
relationship exists by definition between the judges and 
their appointees. The fact that those employees are 
paid by the county does not alter the court's employer 
status. 
 
County of Lehigh v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 489 
A.2d 1325, 1327 (Pa. 1985) (citations omitted). 
 
We do not dispute the proposition that the courts are 
considered the employers of judicial personnel. In our view, 
however, this fact does not preclude the possibility that a 
county may share co-employer or joint employer status 
with the courts. While we have found no case which directly 
implicates this issue in the factual scenario we confront 
here (that is to say, which involves the narrow question of 
the division of responsibilities between counties and courts 
vis-a-vis judicial personnel), we draw some guidance from 
cases which have found joint employment status when two 
entities exercise significant control over the same 
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employees. Cf. NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Penn. Inc., 
691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982) (recognizing concept of 
"joint employer" when separate entities share or co- 
determine conditions of employment); Rivas v. Federacion 
de Asociaciones Pecuarias, 929 F.2d 814, 820-21 (1st Cir. 
1991) (recognizing that when an entity exercises sufficient 
control over employees it may be considered a "joint 
employer"); G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 879 
F.2d 1526, 1531 (7th Cir. 1989) (same). We emphasize that 
this case is unique, and we recognize that the cases we rely 
upon in connection with this question are factually 
distinguishable. But consistent with the legal principle of 
joint employer status discussed in these cases, we conclude 
that although a court may have the "inherent right" to hire 
and fire employees -- even though those employees are 
paid by a county -- it may also have the derivative right to 
delegate employer-type responsibilities to a county. 
 
Here, the Clerks allege exactly that -- i.e., that the 
County acted on authority delegated to it by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Specifically, the Clerks allege 
that the County was integrally involved in their employment 
activities. For example, the Clerks were covered by the 
County's personnel policies.8 Additionally, every five years, 
the Clerks received pins for excellent service from the 
County. Thus, unlike the plaintiffs in LeGrand, the Clerks 
do not contend that Dauphin County's funding of their 
positions alone is sufficient to impose co-employer status 
on the County. See LeGrand v. Lowery, No. CV-93-1980, 
slip op. at 4 (M.D. Pa. May 3, 1994) ("[T]he plaintiffs 
contend that County funding of the plaintiffs' positions is 
indeed sufficient in itself to impose employer status on the 
County."). Rather, the Clerks argue that the County 
assumed de facto responsibility over their employment. 
 
The district court rejected the contentions of the Clerks, 
concluding that this case was indistinguishable from 
LeGrand, which, of course, arose from the same facts as 
those presented here.9 Because LeGrand formed the basis 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. These policies included holidays, vacation time, maternity leave, sick 
leave, etc. 
9. As noted earlier, LeGrand was summarily affirmed by this Court. See 
LeGrand v. Lowery, 65 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 1995) (unpublished table 
decision). 
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of the district court's decision in this case, we will discuss 
LeGrand in some detail. 
 
In LeGrand, the district court concluded that county 
funding of the plaintiffs' positions was insufficient to 
impose employer status on Dauphin County. LeGrand, slip 
op. at 4. While conceding that a payor-payee relationship is 
generally indicative of an employer-employee relationship, 
the court found funding alone insufficient to impose 
employer status on Dauphin County because the County 
was required by state law to fund positions for the courts. 
In other words, the court found that the County's lack of 
authority over the personnel decisions of the court absolved 
the County of any liability as an employer. Id. at 6. The 
LeGrand court did acknowledge, however, that the proper 
inquiry under Title VII for determining employer status 
looks to the nature of the relationship regardless of whether 
that party may or may not be technically described as an 
"employer." Id. at 7. The inquiry, as articulated by Sibley 
Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 
1973), looks to the level of control an organization asserts 
over an individual's access to employment and the 
organization's power to deny such access. See also 
Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 611 
F. Supp. 344, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("When an employer has 
the right to control the means and manner of an 
individual's performance . . . an employer-employee 
relationship is likely to exist."), aff'd, 770 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 
1985). The LeGrand court found that under the "control" 
test, the County's lack of authority to withhold funding for 
the employees' positions precluded the County from 
"controlling access" to the employees' employment 
opportunities. LeGrand, slip op. at 8. 
 
Although we do not disagree with the district court's 
analysis in LeGrand, in our view, LeGrand is 
distinguishable from this case. Unlike the plaintiffs in 
LeGrand, the Clerks have alleged facts in their complaint, 
which, if proven, would allow them to show that Dauphin 
County, through its actions, was the de facto co-employer 
of the Clerks. As noted earlier, the Clerks do not contend 
that Dauphin County's funding of their positions is 
sufficient to impose employer status on the County. Rather, 
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the Clerks claim that the County, through its funding, 
actions and policies, exercised the requisite control over the 
daily employment activities of the Clerks to incur liability as 
a co-employer. 
 
Further, and perhaps most important, the Clerks contend 
that two of them were hired by County officials to work in 
Magisterial District 12-1-04.10 In our view, this asserted fact 
alone should have precluded the district court from 
deciding the matter on a motion to dismiss.11 
 
We also find it significant that the Clerks were covered by 
the County's sexual harassment policy. Although Lowery 
could have legally ignored the policy, he did not. Cf. Settelen 
v. County of Berks, No. 90-5992, 1991 WL 124572, at *2 
(E.D. Pa. June 28, 1991) (county board of judges explicitly 
exempted court-appointed employees from county employee 
handbook). It is not disputed that the Clerks understood 
that they were covered by the policy. Indeed, the Clerks 
drafted a complaint pursuant to the policy and submitted 
it to a County official. Based on these actions, we find it 
reasonable to infer that the Clerks expected the County to 
have the authority to intervene in the situation. This 
expectation was solidified when the County convened an 
investigative panel and provided the Clerks with counseling 
services. Although employee expectations are not 
dispositive of employer status, they are relevant to our 
analysis. See Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1337 
(6th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he most important requirement is that 
there be sufficient indicia of an interrelationship . . . to 
justify the belief on the part of an aggrieved employee that 
the [alleged co-employer] is jointly responsible for the acts 
of the immediate employer."). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Laura C. Segarra and Debra Napper allege that they were hired, 
respectively, by John Bottonare and Phillip Intrieri, both of whom work 
for Dauphin County. 
 
11. The LeGrand court refrained from considering the implications of 
County input into the hiring process. See LeGrand, slip op. at 8 n.2 
("[W]e have no occasion to consider whether the County could be a Title 
VII employer in other circumstances when it does have input into the 
hiring process."). 
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In sum, the precise contours of an employment 
relationship can only be established by a careful factual 
inquiry. See Magnuson v. Peak Tech. Servs., Inc., 808 F. 
Supp. 500, 510 (E.D. Va. 1992) (determining whether a 
defendant is a "joint employer" under Title VII requires 
"[c]onsideration of all of the circumstances surrounding the 
work relationship"), aff'd, 40 F.3d 1244 (4th Cir. 1994); see 
also NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Penn., Inc., 691 F.2d 
1117, 1121 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that under the NLRA, 
"the question of `joint employer status' is a factual one"). 
Here, the Clerks alleged facts in their complaint, which, if 
true, could allow a jury to find that Dauphin County was 
the co-employer of the Clerks. Specifically, the Clerks 
alleged that they were covered by the County's personnel 
policies, that they were told that they were County 
employees, that the County investigated their allegation of 
sexual harassment, that they were subject to termination 
and/or reinstatement by the County and that two of them 
were hired by the County. 
 
By failing to take these allegations into account, and 
instead referring solely to the not-yet-implemented dictates 
of Pennsylvania law, the district court elevated form over 
function. The court could have, of course, looked to state 
law as one of many factors in making its determination. 
But, again, "a plaintiff's status as an employee under Title 
VII can be determined only upon careful analysis of the 
myriad facts surrounding the employment relationship in 
question." Miller v. Advanced Studies, 635 F. Supp. 1196 
(N.D. Ill. 1986). Indeed, such an analysis is essential when, 
as here, the nature of the employment relationship is quite 
uncertain. 
 
We decline to speculate as to whether the Clerks will 
ultimately succeed in their claim against Dauphin County. 
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) ("The 
issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but 
whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support 
the claims."). We merely note that the employment 
relationship between the Clerks and the County was 
sufficiently ambiguous that the Clerks' claim against the 
County should not have been dismissed at the pleading 
stage. See DeFranks v. Court of Common Pleas, 68 F.E.P. 
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Cases 1306, 1310 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (denying county's motion 
to dismiss Title VII complaint filed by a court reporter on 
the ground that the court reporter "must . . . be afforded 
the opportunity to establish the facts relevant to her 
employment"). Indeed, the County's own actions indicate 
that even it was unsure about its responsibilities to the 
Clerks. For example, the County's initial refusal to 
acquiesce in Lowery's retaliation attempt against Vennie 
and LeGrand suggests that the County thought that it may 
have owed a duty to those employees.12  
 
Finally, we note that insulating the County from any 
liability solely out of deference to state law would 
undermine the important policies underlying Title VII -- 
that is, to eradicate employment discrimination through 
federal remedies and to ensure compensation for victims. 
See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1982); 
Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 
755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985). In our view, if the Clerks 
can prove the allegations in their complaint and, 
consequently, prove that the County was their de facto co- 
employer, liability might very well lie with the County as 
well as with their employer as defined by Pennsylvania law. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Dauphin County could be liable to the Clerks even though it did not 
directly engage in the harassing conduct. See Kinnally v. Bell of 
Pennsylvania, 748 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("The inaction of 
executive and management personnel may serve as a basis for liability 
under Title VII even where these high-level employees have played no 
direct role in the alleged discrimination."); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 
1193, 1199 (8th Cir. 1981) (noting that "toleration of a discriminatory 
atmosphere alone gives rise to a cause of action"). The Clerks allege that 
the County did nothing to protect them from Lowery's harassing conduct 
and that the County, as their co-employer, had the duty to do so. 
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